I. Introduction
A simple intuition underlying most utility-based asset pricing models (which presume state-independent and time-separable utility functions) is that, in the absence of trading frictions, the marginal utility of current consumption, u'(ct), multiplied by the current price of an asset (Pt) should equal the discounted expected marginal utility of future consumption at any date t + T, u'(ct+T), multiplied by the expected price of the asset and any cash disbursements (Pt+T). Formally, We are very grateful to Gail Belonsky and Wei Shi for superb research assistance and to the Berkeley Program in Finance for financial support. The paper has benefited from comments from Wayne Ferson and seminar participants at Berkeley, Carnegie Mellon, the University of Colorado, the National Bureau of Economic Research's Summer Institute, Princeton, and Yale. We would especially like to thank George Constantinides and Ravi Jagannathan for several very incisive conversations and Jose Scheinkman (the editor) and Erzo Luttmer (the referee) for many helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier draft. All errors remain our own.
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In this paper, we examine whether the presence of market frictions can explain the failure of consumption and asset return data to satisfy the restrictions imposed by the equilibration of intertemporal marginal rates of substitution (IMRS).2 We consider four types of market frictions. The first type of market friction is a no-short-sale constraint, which prevents the short selling of some subset of assets. The second type is a borrowing constraint, which precludes investors' current consumption from exceeding their current wealth. This prevents, for instance, borrowing against future labor income.3 Third, we consider solvency constraints, which restrict the wealth process at some future date from falling below some predetermined level. Finally, we consider the impact of transaction costs that include bid-ask spreads and commissions. Combinations of these frictions are also considered.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we derive necessary conditions for market equilibrium in the presence of trading frictions. The necessary conditions amount to a set of first-order conditions that must hold for every investor in the economy in the presence of market frictions. They are the natural analogue to the firstorder condition (1), which holds for a representative investor in a frictionless world. Section III extends the framework developed in Hansen and Jagannathan (1991) and develops diagnostic tests of the impact of market frictions on the equilibrium relation between asset returns and IMRS. We discuss the data and the empirical results in Section IV. The results suggest that neither transaction costs nor portfolio constraints, by themselves, can explain the apparent failure of comovements of per capita consumption and asset returns to satisfy the first-order conditions that equilibrate intertemporal marginal rates of substitution. However, the results suggest that a combination of these market frictions can drive a large enough wedge between IMRS so that the apparent violations may not be inconsistent with market equilibrium. Section V presents concluding remarks. 2 A closely related analysis of the impact of market frictions has been independently performed by Luttmer (1991) . He derives equilibrium conditions from a no-arbitrage argument using the results of Jouini and Kallal (1991), whereas we derive similar conditions directly from a set of first-order conditions that individuals' intertemporal marginal rates of substitution must satisfy. For purposes of testing utility-based asset pricing models, these two approaches are essentially equivalent. From a theoretical perspective, the no-arbitrage approach circumvents certain problems that arise in deriving equilibrium conditions for Arrow-Debreu state prices in the presence of transaction costs.
3 At a theoretical level, Scheinkman and Weiss (1986) noted that borrowing constraints may contribute to the failure of the equilibration of intertemporal marginal rates of substitution. Zeldes (1989) has shown empirically that borrowing constraints affect the consumption of a significant portion of the population.
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II. Equilibrium with Market Frictions
Consider a discrete-time securities market economy in which there are N + 1 assets available for investing at dates 0, 1, 2 .... The first N assets are risky securities. We denote the N vector of their dollar returns (principal plus any capital gain or loss and cash disbursement), from dates t to t + 1, by Rt+ 1. The N + 1 st asset is a riskless bond, which earns a certain real return of Rft+1 (principal plus interest).
This 
where wt is an N vector of portfolio weights, 1 is an N vector of ones, and EJ[-] denotes the conditional expectation based on information available as of date t.5 Financial wealth Wt is the amount of wealth available at time t for current consumption and investment. It does not include the present value of future labor income. Since we want to focus on the impact of market frictions, we shall assume stateindependent and time-separable utility functions throughout this paper.6 The investor's optimal consumption and investment problem (2)-(3) can be solved by dynamic programming. LetJ(Wt, t) be the indirect utility function at time t; we have omitted the dependence of J on the information set at time t. The investor solves J(Wt, t) = max u(c,) + P3E J(Wt+ 1, t + 1),
Ct?O 4For ease of notation, we shall not index investors even though they can have different utility functions and endowments. We presume, in a Walrasian spirit, that all investors face identical asset menus and that they are not able to signal individual traits, such as their probability of being liquidity constrained.
5The expectation symbol E[-] (without the t subscript) will subsequently be used to denote the unconditional expectations operator. Variables with tildes denote random variables as of the conditioning date. 6 Equilibrium conditions under more general preferences would be very similar to those derived here, except the ratio of marginal utilities would be replaced by an appropriately redefined IMRS. 
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The returns on assets with no short-sale constraints (i E Ac) satisfy the same equality first-order conditions as in (1). The inequality restriction for the rest may be strict in (8) However, (10) may not hold if the Lagrangian multiplier varies over time and is not independent of asset returns. The equilibrium condition (11) is also the first-order condition that must hold (i) in the heterogeneous agent model of Constantinides and Duffie (1991) and (ii) with short-sale constraints on all risky and riskless assets. In general, without the limited liability assumption, however, solvency constraints are not the same as short-sales restrictions on all assets, and the asset equilibrium condition would differ from (11).
Short-sale and borrowing constraints. -When short-sale and borrowing constraints are both imposed, we can combine the two cases from above to get the following first-order conditions: As above, all these inequalities must hold for every investor in the economy. These inequalities may be strict and also hold in unconditional form. Proofs of this equilibrium condition and the previous condition are contained in the Appendix.
III. Market Frictions and Intertemporal Substitution: Diagnostic Tests
In this section, we discuss diagnostic tests of the impact of market frictions on the equilibrium relation between asset returns and intertemporal marginal rates of substitution. We make use of the framework developed by Hansen and Jagannathan (1991), who derive the relation between historical IMRS (based on consumption data) and the mean-standard deviation frontier for IMRS implied by security return data. The results from this section are used to graph the lower bound for the volatility of IMRS implied by asset return data in the presence of market frictions and to examine in Section IV whether historical IMRS based on consumption data lie above the lowerbound frontier.9 Historical IMRS will be computed using per capita consumption data. In general, it is difficult to justify rigorously the use of aggregate (i.e., per capita) consumption data for asset pricing tests in economies with incomplete markets and trading frictions. However, we shall proceed by assuming that the consumption of U.S. investors can be aggregated to a single representative agent.'0 The existence of a representative agent ensures that all the equilibrium conditions derived in Section II must be satisfied for per capita consumption data. 
A. IMRS Frontiers
where AL and AU are N vectors whose elements are restricted by the equilibrium relations presented in Section II. For estimation purposes, we assume that the time-series sequences of the growth rates of per capita consumption and asset returns are jointly stationary and ergodic. This implies that the sequence mtRt is also stationary and ergodic. These stationarity assumptions allow us 12 In the absence of market frictions, the existence of a riskless unit discount bond would allow investors to observe the equilibrium value of E[m&t+l]. However, even if the riskless unit discount bond existed, market frictions might cause the observed price to differ from E ih+ 1]. We denote v as the price at which a riskless unit discount bond would trade. Since v is not observable, the bounds on IMRS will be computed for a range of values for v. 13 We The lower bound for the volatility of IMRS depends on the population value of X. In practice, it is difficult to obtain sample estimates of X without explicitly solving for the general equilibrium. To avoid this problem, we take the worst case to find the lowest possible bound for IMRS. Specifically for a given v, the lower bound can be found by choosing X to minimize (25). We denote the set of lowest possible volatility bounds as U QA (27) AkL --C --X, AU This feasible region can be estimated using sample means and covariances of asset returns and does not require consumption data. 
Transaction Costs
Again, we can take the worst case to find the lowest possible bound for IMRS: Given the sharp rejections of the IMRS bounds found by Hansen and Jagannathan (1991) and others, the focus on the lowest possible bound, defined by (27) and (31), provides a minimal hurdle for the consumption and return data. Hence, we can unambiguously reject the model if historical IMRS lie outside the feasible region. Failure to reject the inequality conditions, however, does not necessarily lead to an unambiguous conclusion that the equilibrium conditions are satisfied for two reasons. First, we can only "reject" or "fail to reject" the null hypothesis under classical statistical inference. Second, unless a general equilibrium solution that restricts X is solved explicitly, the search for a volatility minimizing X may lead to a very weak test.
B. IMRS Frontiers with Conditioning Instruments
The feasible regions derived above can be sharpened if we incorporate conditioning instruments into the analysis.'4 Specifically, let z, be a nonnegative instrumental variable observable at time t. Define the renormalized variable r' = z IE[zt], which has an unconditional mean equal to one. In the absence of transaction costs, the following equilibrium restriction must also hold: The feasible IMRS regions, based on the relations above, can be drawn using the same techniques discussed in the previous subsection. They will undoubtedly lie inside the feasible regions based on (27) and (31)-presuming that one of the instruments is a constant vector-and hence sharpen the volatility bound for IMRS.
C. IMRS Frontiers with Positivity Constraints
The IMRS frontiers derived above ignore the fact that marginal rates of substitution are positive because of strict nonsatiation. If we impose a positivity constraint on IMRS, we shall be able to get a tighter bound on the IMRS frontiers. Let RA = R /X (element by element division) denote transformed returns. The population pricing restrictions ( 
B. Graphical Results
In this subsection, we plot the mean-standard deviation frontier for IMRS implied by returns and compare it to the IMRS computed from historical consumption data. Figure I depicts the failure of the IMRS minimum maturity of at least 1 month. For a more complete description of the SBBI series, see Ibbotson Associates (1991). 16 As noted in previous studies, the U.S. Commerce Department's X1I seasonal filter does not remove all the seasonal dependencies in the consumption data. For instance, strong monthly seasonals remain. There also appear to be calendar dependencies based on the number of days in the month and the number of Mondays, Tuesdays, etc. in a month. 17 The population series (POPRES) is a first of the month estimate of the total resident population excluding armed forces overseas. 18 The sample skewness and kurtosis statistics suggest that the return series are not lognormally distributed. All the return series have fatter tails than would be expected from a normal distribution. In addition, the equity return series are skewed to the left with evidence of long tails in the positive direction. There is some tendency for fixed income returns to be skewed to the right with long tails in the opposite direction. This evidence of nonnormal distributions may impinge on the small-sample reliability of the confidence intervals. The returns were generated assuming a vector autoregressive system with lags 1-6, 9, and 12. The confidence bounds are based on 3,000 simulations.
19 This corresponds to an annual discount factor of .97. 20 Since we consider the graphs to be primarily diagnostic, we do not present confidence regions for the mean-standard deviation pairs of historical IMRS or formally test whether these point estimates lie outside the confidence regions for the volatility frontiers. The volatility bounds have also been constructed using three alternative measures of consumption-total consumption including durables, nondurables consumption, and the consumption of services-and using quarterly data. The monthly and quarterly results are not substantially different. For the alternative consumption series, the historical mean-standard deviation pairs of IMRS lie within the returns-based IMRS frontier only when consumption of services is used as the measure of consumption, and in that case only for extremely large coefficients of relative risk aversion. To conserve space, we do not present these additional figures.
22 Unlike asset return data, which are very precisely measured, the available consumption data suffer from many serious problems that can potentially have important econometric consequences and could explain the apparent anomalies evident in fig. 1 . Among the most important problems are (i) the time aggregation bias introduced by measuring consumption over an interval rather than at a point in time, (ii) measurement errors in consumption due to infrequent sampling of many of the components and difficulties in imputing service flows from durables, and (iii) seasonal patterns in many types of consumption (e.g., home heating oil and automobile gasoline). In this paper, however, we focus on the ability of market frictions to explain the anomalies. The imposition of borrowing constraints results in a more dramatic shift in the IMRS frontier, which is shown in figure 3, although it is still insufficient to be consistent with the low historical volatility of IMRS based on consumption data for coefficients of relative risk aversion that are less than approximately 10. For an implicit price of a unit discount bond v equal to .9976, X equal to .9987 for all assets24 minimizes the standard deviation of the portfolio with payoffs vto, which is equal to .1062. The volatility of ex post IMRS based on consumption data in this region, where the real riskless rate is approximately 3 percent per year, is less than one-tenth of the volatility bound based on returns. As above, the volatility frontiers with and without positivity constraints coincide for this choice of v. We present in figure 4 the return-based IMRS frontiers in the presence of solvency constraints. The primary difference between solvency and borrowing constraints is that solvency constraints place a restriction on future wealth, for example, WH1, ' L,,,. Hence current financial wealth can in principle be negative (given positive future labor income), whereas borrowing constraints place a restriction on current financial wealth (i.e., ct -Wt.). For implementation purposes, the primary distinction is that in the presence of borrowing constraints the X for all risky assets will be the same and less than or equal to one, whereas they need not be equal under solvency constraints. Relaxation of the equality restriction results in a smaller lower bound on the volatility of IMRS in the presence of solvency constraints than that depicted in figure 3 One of the limitations of the diagnostic tests presented in this paper is that they provide minimal conditions for asset market equilibrium. Hence, the tests may have low power to reject the null hypothesis, especially in the presence of all three market frictions. In an attempt to improve the power of the diagnostic procedure, we also examined whether conditioning instruments could be used to sharpen the restrictions in the presence of market frictions following the discussion in Section IIIB. Toward that end, we effectively expanded the number of assets from five to 15 by using the absolute values of the lagged real Treasury bill returns and the lagged real consumption growth rates as instruments. This did not, however, substantially sharpen the bounds. For instance, for an implicit price of a unit discount bond v equal to .9976, the use of the two instruments did not measurably increase the lower bound above zero. Hence to conserve space, we do not present an additional graph.
V. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have performed diagnostic tests for consumptionbased asset pricing models in the presence of market frictions. In particular, we have examined theoretically and empirically the impact of short-sale restrictions, borrowing constraints that prevent borrowing against future labor income, solvency constraints that restrict the wealth process, and transaction costs on the equilibrium relation between comovements in consumption and asset returns. Our results show that none of the market frictions alone-with the possible exception of solvency constraints-can explain the apparent rejection of the first-order equilibrium conditions between consumption and asset returns, discovered by many researchers. However, a combination of short-sale and borrowing constraints and trading costs does not yield a rejection of the model. The primary limitation of our analysis is that our diagnostic tests, which generally take the form of 114 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY inequality restrictions, are likely to be significantly weaker than the standard tests of equality restrictions.
Appendix
In order to avoid technical problems that can potentially arise for utility functions that have infinite marginal utility at a zero consumption level, we make the following two assumptions: the consumption plan at the optimum is strictly positive and bounded away from zero, and all the returns Rjt+ have compact support. 
Proof of Equilibrium Conditions in the Presence of Transaction
